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ABSTRACT 
With the introduction of inverter energy systems (IESs) to electricity distribution networks, it 
is important for electricity distributors to know the nature of new challenges to basic protection 
systems in the low-voltage (LV) network as the penetration of IESs in distribution networks 
increases.  
For any feeder on a low voltage network hosting IESs, fault currents will have a contribution 
from both the upstream source and from the IESs connected on that same feeder. The clearing 
times of upstream fuses can be affected by the additional current contribution from IESs.  
It is shown how fuse coordination can be preserved in LV networks with high penetrations of 
IES, so that cables are still protected. An IES will shut off under fault conditions either because 
the voltage dips below a threshold, or the upstream fuse clears the fault. Guidelines are 
presented to help combat sympathetic tripping and blinding of fuse protection systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
In low-voltage electricity distribution networks, fuses protect cables and overhead lines from 
carrying excessive current for too long. Fuses are rated to protect the conductor while avoiding 
blowing under load. Overcurrent in cables and lines may in a short period of time damage the 
insulation, or the conductor itself, resulting in costly replacement of sections of line. With roof-
top photovoltaic Inverter Energy Systems (IESs) becoming more common in low-voltage 
distribution networks, it is important that fuse protection functions properly to protect 
downstream conductors in the event of a fault on the line.  
Previous studies have identified sympathetic tripping, as a potential problem that can be caused 
by increased IES penetration [1, 2]. However, they do not provide a clear means of assessing 
and quantifying the potential for fuse blinding and how to guarantee the protection of 
conductors when significant IESs are installed on LV feeders. Coffele et al. studied protection 
blinding in medium voltage (MV) networks in the UK, incorporating distributed generation, 
and concluded that DG on these networks would not cause protection blinding [3]. It is 
worthwhile studying the effect of DG on protection in low-voltage networks, particularly since 
the fault levels in these networks are much lower than in MV networks. 
IESs have systems for under-voltage cut-out – activating when the network voltage collapses, 
and anti-islanding, when the network disappears from the perspective of the IES. There are two 
thresholds for under-voltage cut-out; 200 V (the prevailing legal requirement in New Zealand 
according to the Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010, from AS 4777.3:2005) and 180 V (from 
AS/NZS 4777.2:2015) [4 – 6]. At the time of writing, inverter energy systems must comply 
with AS 4777.3:2005 [7]. Clause 7.4 says that if the system voltage goes below 200 volts for 
longer than a second, then the IES must disconnect within a further one second. This gives a 
maximum disconnection time of two seconds, while maintaining a minimum trip delay time of 
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one second to allow for brief transients. In the AS/NZS 4777.2:2015, which is yet to be applied 
in New Zealand, the under-voltage threshold is 180 volts.  
When a low-impedance fault occurs in an electricity network, a high current will flow from the 
source, and the voltage on the line may or may not drop below the threshold at which IESs 
should disconnect. Since a network may become populated with additional distributed power 
sources, and since it is the task of the fuse to clear the fault current, there is a possibility of 
interaction between IES disconnection and LV fuse protection systems. Above the under-
voltage disconnection threshold, each IES can be expected to remain connected during a fault, 
thereby contributing their own fault current to that fault. The amount of current contributed by 
an inverter is typically around 1.2 times the rated current output [8]. Note that this fault current 
limitation is not applicable to synchronous machines connected distributed generation systems, 
which may have significantly higher fault currents. 
At the electricity distribution level, protection issues can be categorised into either sympathetic 
tripping, or protection blinding.  
Sympathetic tripping 
Sympathetic tripping is the occurrence of unwanted disconnection of generation on healthy 
feeders, as a consequence of a fault on a nearby feeder. This has three sub-categories: 
1.1 When the unwanted disconnection is via a fuse blowing or overcurrent relay operation. 
This sort of disconnection requires human intervention to restore power, as shown in Figure 
1a. 
1.2 When there is an unwanted operation of a protection device (i.e. a fuse blowing) 
downstream of a fault on a feeder. While this does not result in more customers being 
disconnected, it does make the fault recovery more complicated. This situation is shown in 
Figure 1b. 
1.3 When the disconnection of distributed generation on health feeders is due to abnormal 
voltage conditions. This type of disconnection is automatically restored when voltage levels 
return to normal. This sort of disconnection is of little consequence. 
  
Figure 1a: F2 blows before F3 
 
Sympathetic tripping of types 1.1 and 1.2 require that the affected fuse (F2 in Figures 1a and 
1b) blows at the level of fault current that the IES can provide through that fuse (less the current 
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fuse rating would be higher than this current. This situation is easily avoided by the following 
recommendation: 
Recommendation 1: All fuses should be rated at greater than 1.2 times the combined rating of 
downstream connected IESs. 
Protection blinding 
This is defined as when distributed generation on a faulted feeder provides a high enough 
proportion of the fault current that the appropriate feeder fuse does not clear a fault, when part 
of the faulted feeder carries a current that could damage the feeder. For this to occur, two 
conditions must be met. Firstly, the voltage at the IESs on the faulted feeder must remain at or 
above the minimum voltage threshold (200 or 180 volts), such that they remain connected and 
contributing to the fault current. Secondly, the current flow at the fault must be high enough 
that the cable is likely to be damaged. The fault resistance has two bounds – an upper bound 
above which currents are insufficiently high to damage the cable, and a lower bound, below 
which IESs disconnect, and do not contribute to the fault current. This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 2, and determining these bounds is the focus of much of this paper. 
 
Figure 2: Fuse blinding, where the current through F1 is less than the current through the fault 
 
Fault types 
On LV networks, a number of fault types may occur. These may be phase to ground, phase to 
phase, and 3 phase faults. In general phase to phase and 3 phase faults involves phase 
conductors making electrical contact with each other, and are low impedance. In contrast, phase 
to ground faults will often involve a significant fault resistance. Phase to ground faults are 
addressed first, as they clarify the mechanisms involved, and phase to phase faults are 
addressed later in the paper. 
METHOD 
Determination of fault resistance bounds 
The aim of this section is to determine, for a realistic LV network, whether a phase to ground 
fault that should result in a fuse blowing will have voltage levels above the 200 or 180 volt IES 
disconnection threshold. One single-phase branch of a low-voltage feeder is used to build a 
model. The model branch is developed from [9], where the originating low-voltage feeder was 
the “urban” feeder closest to the center of that cluster, otherwise known as “Representative 
residential LV feeder 1”. The branch is depicted in Figure 3 and its characteristics are 








Figure 3: Single phase residential network branch 
 
Table 1: Single-phase residential network branch characteristics 
Name Value Units 
Branch length 322 m 
Number of ICPs 12 - 
Number of phases 1 - 
Maximum line current 265 A 
Zsource 5.454 + j25.26 mΩ 
ΔZline 14.2 + j14.4 mΩ/ICP 
Inverter energy system size 4 kW 
IES current contribution 16.67 A/ICP 
 
The transformer characteristics were estimated based on a minimum short-circuit impedance, 
Zk, for a rated power between 25 and 630 kVA of 4.0%, and a typical value of percentage 
resistance, Rk [10]. A Zk of 4.4%, and an Rk of 0.95% was chosen. From this, the network 
impedance is determined. Fuse sizes were determined from the conductor’s minimum current 
carrying capacity and a 250 amp DIN class gL Size 2 fuse was selected based on Appendix C 
of Orion’s “Network Fuse Application Guide”. The corresponding current-time fusing 
characteristic was found from an Eaton Bussmann series “Technical Data 10164” datasheet, 
with part number 250NHG2B [11] [12].  
The network feeder can be represented in an electrical circuit, as shown in Figure 4, wherewith 
the phasor diagram can be drawn, as shown in Figure 5. Because the fault is resistive, the 
voltage and current at the fault location are in phase. 
 
 
Figure 4: Basic electrical circuit for studying fuse blinding 
 
Number of IESs + ICPs: 12 
Distance between ICPs: 26.8 m 
4.35 kW per ICP 
Fuse Zsource ΔZline 
IESs + ICP 
combination 
12 11 10 3 2 1 
300 kVA 11/0.415 kV 
50 Hz Dyn11 
zk = 4.4%, rk = 0.95% 











Figure 5: Phasor diagram showing voltage relationships in figure 4 
This yields the following equation 
 (1) 
where Vthreshold is the inverter under-voltage cut-out threshold, Rs(x) and Xs(x) are the combined 
system and line resistance and line reactance respectively, and Rf is the resistance of the fault. 
It is assumed that in a four-wire, LV network, the neutral size is the same as the phase size, and 
the phase-neutral impedance is approximately equal to the feeder’s positive sequence 
impedance. Equation 1 is solved for the fault resistance that results in the IES threshold voltage 
appearing at the fault. 
In addition to finding the fault resistance that yields the under-voltage cut-out threshold, a 
similar calculation can be performed to find the fault resistance where the current drawn is 
equal to the line current (or fuse current) rating. This is calculated as, 
  (2) 
Where Ifuse_rating is 250 A, the rating of the fuse. Equation 2 is solved for the fault resistance 
above which a fuse would not normally blow. 
 
Fuse blinding on a low voltage feeder 
A  fault located at the last ICP on a low voltage feeder is considered. The fault current will be 
the sum of the inverter contributions plus the upstream network contribution, as shown in 
Figure 6. The end of the feeder is chosen, as this location has the maximum number of IESs 
upstream, and will result in the largest possible line current close to the fault. Thus the part of 
the line experiencing a potentially damaging current, is upstream of, but close to the fault. This 

























𝐼𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝑋𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  
𝐼𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝑅𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  
𝑉𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  (180 𝑉 𝑜𝑟 200 𝑉) 




Figure 6: Simplification of protection blinding on the branch by considering a fault at the last ICP 
Analysing this circuit gives the following equation 3, which can be solved for Ifuse, the current 
in the fuse, over a range of fault resistances, r = [0..2] Ω, 
  (3) 
Solving this equation, each with total IES current contributions of IIES = 0 A and IIES = 200 A 
gives the curves shown in Figure 9, which is plotted with the 250 A fuse characteristic obtained 
from the Eaton Bussmann datasheet mentioned earlier.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Fault resistance feasibility regions 
Putting all this together makes it possible to distinguish under what fault conditions the 
inverters will stay connected, and under what conditions they will trip on under-voltage. Figure 
7 is generated from equations (1) and (2), where the blue and red points are the values of the 
fault resistance that give a voltage of 200 V or 180 V at the location of the fault, while the black 
points are the values of fault resistance that yield the rated current of the conductor, all with 
respect to distance along the feeder branch, from the source transformer. 
For this example, there is an area in which inverters will remain connected while there is a fault 
on the feeder, and so these IESs will stay connected and contribute to the fault current. This is 
depicted by the red shaded region in Figure 8. The region below the 180 V line (blue points), 
is where IES disconnection can be reasonably expected within two seconds. In this region, the 
fuse protection should operate normally, if all the inverters on the branch disconnect. 
The grey shaded region above the black points is the region in which the fault current is no 
greater than normal load current, and fuses would not be expected to blow. 
 
((𝐼𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝑆) × 𝑅𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑟) + 𝐼𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 × 𝑅𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒)
2
+ (𝐼𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 × 𝑋𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒)
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Figure 7: Feasible fault resistance regions 
 
Figure 8: Feasible fault resistance regions with shaded areas depicting inverter behaviour 
Inverters stay connected 
IES disconnection 




Fuse protection blinding 
Solving equation (3) for the value of current flowing through the fuse, for both zero IES current 
contribution (blue trace) and 200 A IES current contribution (red trace) allows Figure 10 to be 
drawn, which plots fuse current versus fault resistance. The figure depicts the situation only at 
the end of the feeder, so in Figure 8, the relevant problem fault resistance can be found at the 
end of the feeder branch between the 180 V line and the load current line, or approximately 
between 0.6 and 0.9 Ω. The black trace is the sum of the current contributions (200 A) from 
the inverters plus the current flowing in the fuse to give the current flowing in the fault, and 
therefore the current in the cable section before the fault.  
 
 





Figure 10: Current through upstream fuse, and fault, with fusing current superimposed, vs fault resistance, close up 
Figure 10 zooms in on Figure 9, and shows three distinct regions in which three different 
behaviours occur. Below the fault resistance found previously (0.6 Ω), the IESs begin to trip 
on under-voltage (180 V) due to their passive islanding protection. Above around 0.9 Ω, the 
fault current appears to be no greater than the line rating, and so the cable is in no danger of 
overheating. However, between these two regions, blinding of the fuse protection is possible. 
For example, for a fault resistance of 0.7 Ω, the current passing through the fuse (red trace), is 
100 A, while the current experienced by the end-section of conductor that feeds the fault is 
above 300 A. In this instance, the fuse will not act to protect the conductor, and the fault current 
will continue to pass, until the fault is cleared by some other means, or until load/inverter 
conditions change on that feeder section. 
In summary, for a realistic LV feeder, it is quite possible for line current to be greater than the 
current experienced by the protective fuse. For this to be avoided, the following 
recommendation should be followed: 
Recommendation 2: It is possible that cable current may exceed fuse rated current by 1.2 
times the maximum combined rating of IESs on each particular single phase of that feeder. 
Therefore fuses should be rated no greater than the cable rating minus 1.2 times the combined 
IES ratings on the protected feeder. 
Phase to phase faults 
Phase to phase faults are normally very low impedance, as they result from a direct electrical 
connection between 2 conductors. They result in a halving of the phase to neutral voltage at 
the point of the fault, although the reduction is less strong closer to the supply transformer. IES 
systems close to the supply transformer may remain connected for a fault near the end of a 































Fuse blinding in this region 
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situation, be equal to the fuse current plus the IES fault current contribution. However, 
Recommendation 2 obviates the chance of cable currents being exceeded without fuse 
protection operating. 
CONCLUSION / PROTECTION GUIDELINES 
This paper examines two potential protection problems reported in the literature, applied to a 
NZ typical LV network. The problem of sympathetic tripping is met with a simple 
recommendation, that would be met anyway under normal protection setting guidelines. 
The problem of protection blinding, where inverter energy systems may contribute to higher 
line currents than experienced by LV line fusing is investigated, and found to be possible. This 
problem is also addressed by a simple fuse sizing recommendation, such that cables are still 
protected from damage. The conclusions reached for single phase to ground faults 
approximately hold for phase to phase faults, such that the same recommendation is valid. 
Both problems require significant IES penetration, and poorly considered fuse sizing. Although 
there is value in examining other LV networks to test the likelihood of such issues, and further 
investigation of phase to phase and 3 phase faults would be useful, the recommendations are 
likely to remain un-altered. This is the subject of future work. 
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